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NULLIFYING THE DEBT CEILING THREAT ONCE AND
FOR ALL: WHY THE PRESIDENT SHOULD EMBRACE
THE LEAST UNCONSTITUTIONAL OPTION
Neil H. Buchanan* & Michael C. Dorf**
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2011, Congress and the President narrowly averted economic
and political catastrophe, agreeing at the last possible moment to authorize a
series of increases in the national debt ceiling.1 This respite, unfortunately, was
merely temporary. The amounts of the increases in the debt ceiling that
Congress authorized in 2011 were only sufficient to accommodate the
additional borrowing that would be necessary through the end of 2012. In an
economy that continued to show chronic weakness—weakness that continues
to this day—the federal government would predictably continue to collect
lower-than-normal tax revenues and to make higher-than-normal expenditures,
which meant that the debt would necessarily grow over time. Because there is
no reason to believe that the annual budget will be balanced after 2012—
indeed, because that would be an affirmatively bad idea, even if the economy
were to return to full employment2—everyone knew that the debt ceiling
would have to be raised by the beginning of 2013, to accommodate economic
reality as the country continues to try to return to prosperity.
As soon as the agreement temporarily averting the crisis was reached in
2011, however, the two top Republican leaders in Congress announced that
they planned to demand additional spending cuts every time in the future that
the debt ceiling needed to be increased.3 Their strategy appears to be based on
*
Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School, and Senior Fellow at
the Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute, Monash University.
**
Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. The authors thank
Angela N. Buckner, Robert F. Lehman, and Sergio Rudin for excellent research assistance and
the editors of the Columbia Law Review for publishing this essay on an expedited schedule.
1. See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 301, 125 Stat. 240, 251–55
(delegating to president power to raise debt ceiling pursuant to complicated procedure whereby
members of Congress do not directly vote for debt ceiling increase).
2. See Neil H. Buchanan, Good Deficits: Protecting the Public Interest from Deficit
Hysteria, 31 Va. Tax Rev. 75, 105–15 (2011) (articulating benefits of deficit spending, even in
good economic times).
3. See 157 Cong. Rec. S5219 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell)
(“[N]ever again will any President, from either party, be allowed to raise the debt ceiling . . .
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the assumption that reaching the debt ceiling would, as a matter of course,
require the president to cut spending in order to keep total borrowing under the
statutory limit. If that were a correct reading of the Constitution, the president
would in each case be forced to choose between inflicting severe and
immediate austerity on the country at the moment the ceiling was reached—
making spending cuts adequate to reduce total spending, so that it would match
the tax revenues flowing into the Treasury—and accepting less severe austerity
in the immediate term, by agreeing to cut spending by larger amounts in the
future as the “price” of allowing borrowing to rise in the immediate term, with
concomitantly smaller spending cuts up front. We addressed the debt ceiling
standoff in an article published in the Columbia Law Review earlier this year:
How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President
(and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff4 (hereinafter “How to Choose”).
We argued there that it is incorrect to assume that the president can, or should,
reduce authorized spending if the federal government reaches its statutory debt
ceiling. Instead, we argued that the president should faithfully carry out the
exact levels of spending and taxes that are required by the duly enacted budget
of the United States—even if doing so requires him to exceed the debt
ceiling—by issuing Treasury bonds in amounts sufficient to finance the
difference between the levels of spending and taxation that Congress has
authorized.
As this follow-up essay is being published, in late December 2012, the
President and congressional Republicans are in the midst of budget
negotiations that may hinge on whether our argument was correct—that the
president has a duty under the Constitution to set aside the debt ceiling, if the
moment of truth comes. Unfortunately, none of the participants in the
negotiations has offered any public indication that they even understand the
nature of the problem that the president would face, much less how to resolve
that problem, should Congress refuse to raise the debt ceiling.
We argue here that the President should make it clear, as soon as possible,
that the debt ceiling is not, and cannot legally be used as, a cudgel with which
Congress can force him to renegotiate the federal budget. If the President does
not do so now, the problem will continue to arise in the future, every time the
debt level grows (as it should, in a growing economy which offers continuing
opportunities for public investment) above the arbitrary dollar limit that
Congress might set. Therefore, the President’s best course is to make clear that
the debt ceiling must always give way to the wishes of Congress, as expressed
through the budget of the United States.

without having to engage in the kind of debate we have just come through.”); Jonathan Weisman,
G.O.P. Pledges New Standoff on Debt Limit, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2012, at A1 (reporting House
Speaker John A. Boehner’s vow “to hold up another increase in the federal debt ceiling unless it
was offset by larger spending cuts”).
4. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option:
Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1175
(2012).
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II. THE DEBT CEILING, THE “TRILEMMA,” AND ANOTHER UNNECESSARY
AND HARMFUL POLITICAL CRISIS
As part of the agreement that averted a default on government obligations
in mid-2011, both sides agreed to a provision suggested by Senate Minority
Leader Mitch McConnell, under which the President was authorized to propose
increases in the debt ceiling, and Congress would then have the ability (with a
supermajority vote) to overrule the President’s decision.5 President Obama did,
indeed, propose such increases, which took effect when Congress failed to
block them.6
As another political crisis began to come to a boil in late 2012, the
President suggested that the parties agree to make the McConnell approach the
permanent method for dealing with the debt ceiling, allowing the President to
increase the debt ceiling with congressional authorization ex post, thus making
it possible for the President to execute the budget of the United States.7 In
response, Senator McConnell said of the President, on the floor of the Senate:
“[N]ow the President is asking for unlimited—unlimited—authority to borrow
whenever he wants to for whatever amount he wants.”8
That is either a misunderstanding or a mischaracterization of what is at
issue in this debate. As we discussed in How to Choose, when the debt ceiling
limits the president’s ability to issue debt sufficient to make up the difference
between the funds on hand and appropriated expenditures, it presents the
president with what we called a “trilemma”9: faced with the constitutional duty
to execute the spending laws that Congress enacted, to collect tax revenues
under the laws that Congress enacted, and to borrow no more than the amount
of gross debt specified in the debt ceiling statute, the president would have to
violate at least one of those laws when the debt ceiling is reached. In thus
violating his oath to faithfully execute the laws—all of the laws—of the United
States, he would be acting unconstitutionally. The only question was which
unconstitutional choice would be least unconstitutional.

5. See supra note 1.
6. See H.R.J. Res. 98, 112th Cong. (2012) (as rejected by Senate, Jan. 26, 2012)
(disapproving President’s debt limit increase); Robert Pear, Senate Vote Approves Rise of $1.2
Trillion in Debt Limit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 2012, at A12 (reporting Senate’s approval of increase
as evidenced by its rejection of H.R.J. Res. 98).
7. Treasury Secretary Geithner appeared on various television programs to explain the
Obama Administration’s position supporting the extension of the “McConnell provision” to deal
with the debt ceiling. See Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast Dec. 2, 2012), transcript
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57556677/face-the-nation-transcriptsdecember-2-2012-geithner-sens-graham-feinstein-rep-rogers/; Meet the Press (NBC television
broadcast
Dec.
2,
2012),
transcript
available
at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/50045823/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/december-tim-geithnerbob-corker-claire-mccaskill-grover-norquist-chris-van-hollen-jim-cramer-mariabartiromo/#.UM4tanPjkZg.
8. 158 Cong. Rec. S7645 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell).
9. Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1197 (explaining that in such circumstances the
president “faces a ‘trilemma’: a choice between three bad options, all of which are
unconstitutional”).
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Our analysis showed that the president’s choice must be to honor
Congress’s wishes regarding spending and taxes by setting aside its purported
limitation on gross national debt.10 In order to execute the budget (which is
composed of the taxing and spending laws) as enacted by Congress, the
president would obviously not require (or seek) unlimited authority to borrow,
as Senator McConnell claimed. Instead, he would simply issue enough new
Treasury obligations to finance the amount of borrowing that Congress’s
budget necessitates. Although the president could instead choose to act
unconstitutionally by violating the spending law or the taxing law (that is, by
spending less, or taxing more, than Congress had ordered him to do), and thus
keep the debt level below the statutory limit, he would be wrong to do so.
The reasons that we articulated in How to Choose remain true today.
Congress retains the power to return the national debt to whatever level it sees
fit, by passing budgets in the future that would result in annual surpluses
sufficient to pay down the debt, to reach any congressionally desired target.
Moreover, the president’s decision to issue debt in order to execute the
congressionally mandated spending and taxing levels would do the least
constitutional damage—that is, it would involve the smallest possible exercise
of presidential discretion over judgments committed by the Constitution to
Congress—because doing so would not give the president the ability to
rebalance the spending and taxing priorities that are at the core of Congress’s
budgeting process.11 A president who chose to set aside the debt ceiling in
such a situation would, therefore, be exercising unconstitutional powers in the
most restrained manner possible—under the impossible circumstances that
Congress would have imposed upon him.
In early December of 2012, Republican leaders announced that they
would follow through on their earlier threats to try to force the President to
choose between defaulting on the government’s legal obligations and
exceeding the debt ceiling.12 Questions again arose in public discussion about
whether the President would use one of the constitutional arguments available
to him to void the debt ceiling. One of those arguments, which we also
endorsed in How to Choose, was based on Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which forbids actions that would cause “[t]he validity of the
public debt of the United States” to be “questioned.” If Congress would not
increase the debt ceiling, making it possible for the federal government to

10. See id. at 1215 (concluding that “the president would minimize his assumption of power
by issuing debt rather than rebalancing taxing and spending choices”).
11. See id at 1214–15 (discussing “costs of allowing a president to violate the balance of
Congress’s priorities in taxing and spending” including “usurp[ing] legislative power”).
12. See Russell Berman, Debt Ceiling Complicates Deficit Talks, The Hill (Dec. 5, 2012,
7:59 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/271347-debt-limit-complicates-deficittalks (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing growing “threats on an increase in the
debt ceiling”); Richard Rubin, Republicans Reprise 2011 Debt-Limit Threat in Cliff Talks,
Bloomberg (Dec. 3, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-03/republicansreprise-2011-debt-limit-threat-in-cliff-talks.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(reporting Republican leadership’s attempts to “replicat[e] the 2011 showdown that caused the
U.S. to come within days of default”).
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honor its debts, this provision would be violated.13
In response to questions about the President’s possible plans to invoke
this argument, the White House Press Secretary announced: “[T]his
administration does not believe that the 14th Amendment gives the president
the power to ignore the debt ceiling—period.”14 Notably, however, this
statement did not address, or even acknowledge, that the President would face
a trilemma. That is, even setting aside the language from Section 4, the
President would still violate the Constitution no matter what choice he made.
Yet the White House has said nothing to date about why it would try to resolve
the constitutional crisis by cutting spending, rather than raising taxes or issuing
additional debt.
At most, the President’s spokesman could reasonably have been saying
that the Administration does not think that the proper reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment authorizes a president to issue debt in excess of the current dollar
value of the debt ceiling. The White House is correct that the
unconstitutionality of the debt ceiling does not itself empower the president to
borrow money without congressional authorization. Whenever it passes a
budget that is expected to result in an annual deficit, however, Congress
authorizes the president to borrow the necessary funds to cover that shortfall. If
the debt ceiling makes it impossible to do so, and if (as we argue) that makes
the debt ceiling itself unconstitutional, then the president would not be
arrogating to himself the authority to borrow money. Instead, he would simply
be borrowing money that Congress has already authorized him to borrow. Such
borrowing would clearly be constitutionally valid if the debt ceiling is
unconstitutional because of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the trilemma,
the additional borrowing would be constitutionally invalid, but because it
would be less unconstitutional than the other options, issuing additional debt
would be the required choice.
This issue is increasingly urgent. Currently, the federal government is not
operating on a standard, fiscal-year-long budget. When the 2012 fiscal year
ended on September 30, 2012, Congress enacted a continuing resolution, valid
through March 27, 2013 (if not superseded prior to that date), that required the
President to spend and tax in amounts that guaranteed that the debt ceiling
would be reached at the end of 2012.15 Even if the Treasury Department again
employs extraordinary accounting measures to extend the period before the
debt ceiling would become unavoidably binding, the day of reckoning is now
expected to be reached in early February 2013—before the current budget law

13. Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1194 (after acknowledging the possibility of
reasonable disagreement, concluding that, “during an impasse of the sort that was narrowly
avoided in August 2011, Section 4 would require the president to refuse to honor the debt ceiling
if doing so would cause the government to fail to meet any of its financial obligations in a timely
manner”).
14. Press Briefing, White House Press Sec’y Jay Carney (Dec. 6, 2012, 11:58 AM), available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/06/press-briefing-press-secretary-jaycarney-12062012 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
15. Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-175, § 106, 126 Stat.
1313, 1315 (2012).
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has expired.16
Accordingly, congressional refusal to increase the debt ceiling would, in
fact, create the trilemma that we have described. If we are right that the debt
ceiling itself is constitutionally defective, then the President would be legally
required to borrow the money that Congress has already ordered him to
borrow, in order to spend and tax in the amounts that it specified in its
continuing budget resolution.
Yet, as noted above, the White House has not at any time even described
the legal choices that the President would face as constitutionally problematic.
To be sure, the Administration has emphatically called upon Congress to
increase the debt ceiling as a matter of course (not subject to any political
“price”), but it has framed that argument entirely in policy and pragmatic
terms.
Having publicly ruled out the argument based on Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the White House has thus ignored the other (more
fundamental) constitutional problem and merely taken the public stance that
Congress should change its ways. Is it possible that the President and his
advisors simply do not understand the elements of the trilemma? That seems
unlikely.17
III. WHAT THE WHITE HOUSE MIGHT BE THINKING, AND WHY IT WOULD
BE WRONG IF IT IS
To understand the reasoning that may be underwriting the Obama
Administration’s refusal to entertain borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling,
we begin with common ground. We agree with the Administration about this
much: Even if failure to pay some category of government obligees would
violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not automatically
follow that the president may unilaterally issue debt in excess of the debt
ceiling, for doing so could usurp congressional power to limit the scope of its
delegation of borrowing authority, as Congress purported to do when it enacted
the debt ceiling. If there were a practicable alternative method by which the
government could meet its obligations without the president engaging in
16. E.g., Steve Bell et al., Bipartisan Policy Ctr., Debt Limit Analysis 4–5 (2012).
17. The President and his staff may not carefully read every issue of the Columbia Law
Review, but presumably they do peruse the New York Times. See Bruce Bartlett, The Debt Limit
is the Real Fiscal Cliff, Economix Blog, N.Y. Times (Dec. 3, 2012, 6:00 AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/the-debt-limit-is-the-real-fiscal-cliff/ (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4). Perhaps the
Administration understands that the President would face a trilemma if Congress fails to raise the
debt ceiling but takes the view that when faced with only unconstitutional options, a president
may choose whichever option he pleases, free of constitutional constraint. See Brad DeLong,
Debt Ceiling: Mark Tushnet Says: “Bruce Bartlett is No True Scotsman” (July 1, 2011, 11:34
AM), http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2011/07/debt-ceiling-mark-tushnet-says-bruce-bartlett-is-notrue-scotsman.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that by giving President
Obama inconsistent commands “Congress has punted what to do to the Treasury”). If so, we
would welcome acknowledgment of the true nature of the problem, even as we would disagree
with the conclusion. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1218 (rejecting suggestion that
obligation to choose among unconstitutional options means “all bets are off”).
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unauthorized borrowing, he would be constitutionally bound to follow that
course.
Perhaps the Administration has ruled out ignoring the debt ceiling
because it has concluded that there are in fact practicable constitutional
options. As we noted in How to Choose, one proposed method for doing so
would be to mint two one-trillion-dollar platinum coins,18 because there is no
statutory limit on the value of such coins that the government may mint.19 We
dismissed this “jumbo coins” proposal as “cartoonish and desperate,”20 but
maybe the Administration has concluded that desperate times demand
desperate measures.
Yet even Professor Jack Balkin, who first seriously publicized the jumbo
coins proposal on his blog in 2011,21 no longer advocates it.22 Further, the
statutory provision that permits the Treasury to mint platinum coins was
enacted as part of a law that clearly manifested Congress’s intent to authorize
the coining of commemorative coins,23 notwithstanding the fact that, as
codified, the current authorization states no such limit.24
Thus, all things considered, we doubt that the Administration has ruled
out borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling on the ground that, if push comes to
shove, it plans to mint jumbo coins. At least absent some official public
statement endorsing the jumbo coin option, we believe that serious
commentators would be wise to disregard it.
We take a similarly dim view of the possibility that the Administration is
contemplating other “outside-of-the-box” options, like auctioning off federal
lands or selling corporate naming rights to national monuments. Again, if such
a bizarre contingency plan existed, one would expect some indication of it
18. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1180 (discussing Professor Jack Balkin’s jumbo
coins proposal).
19. See 31 U.S.C. § 5112(k) (2006) (“The Secretary may mint and issue platinum bullion
coins and proof platinum coins in accordance with such specifications, designs, varieties,
quantities, denominations, and inscriptions as the Secretary, in the Secretary’s discretion, may
prescribe from time to time.”).
20. Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1231.
21. See Jack M. Balkin, 3 Ways Obama Could Bypass Congress, CNN (July 28, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-28/opinion/balkin.obama.options_1_debt-ceilingcongress-coins
[hereinafter Balkin, Ways to Bypass] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting
Treasury circumvent statutory limit on currency notes by issuing two trillion dollar coins).
22. See Brad Plumer, Could Two Platinum Coins Solve the Debt-Ceiling Crisis?,
Wonkblog,
Wash.
Post
(Dec.
7,
2012,
12:37
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/12/07/could-two-platinum-coinssolve-the-debt-ceiling-crisis/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating “even Balkin now
says that he thinks the platinum-coin option is too risky”).
23. See id. (citing H.R. 2614, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-104hr2614rfs/pdf/BILLS-104hr2614rfs.pdf) (“Opponents
could plausibly argue that the original law was intended to set rules around commemorative
coins, not to finance the operations of the government.”); see also James Hamilton, Trillion
Dollar
Platinum
Coin,
Econbrowser
(Dec.
8,
2012,
7:19
AM),
http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2012/12/trillion_dollar.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (characterizing platinum-coin-minting-authorization as “legislation originally
intended to satisfy a small group of numismatists”).
24. See supra note 19 (quoting statutory language).
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from the Administration.25
In any event, it is no mystery what the Administration plans to do in the
event that inaction on the debt ceiling leaves the government with insufficient
borrowing authority to meet its legal obligations. As in 2011, so in 2013, the
Administration apparently plans to spend less money than Congress
authorized.26 The mystery is how the executive could undertake such cuts
within the bounds of the Constitution.
The Administration may take a narrow view of what constitutes an action
that violates Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that it
causes the validity of the public debt to be questioned: Perhaps the
Administration thinks that only failure to pay bondholders, or more narrowly
still, only failure to pay the principal on bonds, would violate Section 4. Let us
grant that assumption for the sake of argument. As we were at pains to show in
How to Choose, and as we have explained again here, even if failure to spend
some substantial portion of appropriated funds would not violate Section 4 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it would violate the separation of powers.27
So far as we have been able to ascertain, neither the Administration nor
the academic critics of setting aside the debt ceiling have even attempted to
explain whence the president derives the authority to spend less money than
Congress has required him to spend. Accordingly, we will make the effort on
their behalf. We think the best argument that might be given in support of
unilateral presidential authority to slash spending rather than to issue debt in
excess of the debt ceiling would go like this:
The president’s failure to spend sums Congress has appropriated would
indeed be unlawful. It would violate both the current appropriations laws and

25. Moreover, even if there might be reasonable disagreement about our conclusion that
failing to pay all federal budgetary obligations in full would violate the constitutional prohibition
of bringing into question the validity of the public debt, we think there would be consensus that
the issuance of jumbo coins (or any other similarly desperate measure to raise money) violates
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Surely, anything that makes the public reasonably
wonder whether the federal government is scraping the bottom of the barrel for ideas on how to
raise money, rather than simply raising the debt ceiling, would cast doubt not just on the validity
of the debt, but on the future of our financial system—and of the political system as well. See
Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1231 (noting jumbo coins option could itself violate Section 4,
since “the very act of minting trillion-dollar coins . . . could undermine faith in the government’s
ability to repay its obligations”).
26. See Interview by Scott Pelley with President Barack Obama, CBS Evening News (CBS
television broadcast July 12, 2011) (describing how debt ceiling may threaten payment of
entitlement benefits); Press Briefing, White House Press Sec’y Jay Carney (July 12, 2011),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/12/press-briefing-presssecretary-jay-carney-7122011 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing decision of
which spending cuts to implement as a “kind of Sophie’s Choice situation”); see also Press
Briefing, White House Press Sec’y Jay Carney (Dec. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/05/press-briefing-press-secretary-jaycarney-and-nec-prinicipal-deputy-dire (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing same
issue and confirming Administration’s refusal to unilaterally raise debt ceiling).
27. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1196–1202 (discussing “trilemma” that arises
from fact that president cannot faithfully execute all laws enacted by Congress, including
appropriations).
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the Impoundment Control Act of 1974.28 However, if faced with the choice of
acting unconstitutionally by unilaterally raising the debt ceiling (or raising
taxes) or acting in violation of mere statutes, the president has a duty to
respect the constitutional limit and violate the statutes. Under such
circumstances, the statutory obligations to spend budgeted amounts are
themselves unconstitutional, because obeisance to them would entail violating
the (constitutionally protected) debt ceiling.
Is that a persuasive argument? We think it would be persuasive if the
premise were correct: If a president’s decision to spend less than the amount
Congress authorized were merely a statutory violation—and if presidential
borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling were not merely a statutory violation—
then yes, the obligation to spend all of the money would have to give way to a
constitutional obligation not to borrow or tax without congressional
authorization. If it is impossible to comply with both the Constitution and a
statute, the duty to comply with the Constitution prevails over the duty to
comply with the statute, at least absent the sort of catastrophic harm that might
be thought to justify unconstitutional action.29
But is the premise true? Would a president’s failure to spend money that
Congress has clearly required him to spend amount to a mere statutory
violation, or is it also a violation of the president’s obligation to take care that
the laws are faithfully executed? And if it is merely statutory, how is it any
different from the debt ceiling, which is itself a statute?
Proponents of presidential spending cuts might attempt to draw an
act/omission distinction between, on the one hand, a president’s unilateral
borrowing, taxing, or spending, and, on the other hand, a president’s unilateral
decision not to borrow, tax, or spend in accordance with an act of Congress.
Presidential borrowing, taxing, or spending beyond what Congress has
authorized, usurps Article I power. However, in this view, a president’s
unilateral failure to spend (or borrow or tax) in the full amount authorized by
Congress does not amount to the exercise of an Article I power; it simply fails
to fully carry out the delegated authority, and therefore violates the relevant
statutes, but not the Constitution.
We are highly dubious about the utility of the act/omission distinction in
this context. Should a president’s decision to cancel a tax deduction or tax
credit be characterized as an affirmative act of taxation—and thus be deemed
unconstitutional—or as a mere omission that fails to fully implement
Congress’s will—and thus be deemed “only” a statutory violation? Under the
circumstances, the label of “act” or “omission” is a conclusion, not a fact in the
world.
In any event, even if we had greater faith in this approach as a matter of
first principle, case law pretty clearly establishes that a president’s failure to
spend funds that Congress has required him to spend is a constitutional

28. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 681– 688
(2006).
29. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1230–31.
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violation. The key decisions are Train v. City of New York30 and Clinton v.
City of New York.31
In Train, the Court unanimously held that a statutory delegation to the
president of the authority to spend money on addressing water pollution was a
requirement that the president spend all of the appropriated funds.32 Taken
alone, of course, Train does no more than establish that Congress can, if it so
specifies, require that the president spend money; it does not say that the
obligation is a constitutional one.
But even taken alone, Train’s logic appears rooted in separation of
powers. The unanimous Court in Train set the case in context by noting that
before President Nixon attempted to impound the funds Congress appropriated
for addressing water pollution, he vetoed the underlying bill.33 Why was that
fact relevant to the case? It does not bear directly on the question of whether
Congress intended to vest discretion in the president to spend less than the
allocated funds. But it does bear on a constitutional issue: If, in the absence of
a delegation of discretionary spending authority from Congress, a president
could nonetheless choose not to spend money that Congress had appropriated,
then he would be able to give himself what amounts to a non-overridable veto
power, in contravention of the lawmaking procedure set forth in Article I,
Section 7. Put simply, whenever the president unilaterally decides not to spend
money that Congress has directed that he spend, he acts in violation of Article
I, Section 7 and his Article II, Section 3 obligation to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed.
Clinton v. City of New York confirms this reading of the obligation to
spend as a constitutional obligation. In Clinton, the majority and dissent
disagreed over the question of whether Congress, in enacting the Line Item
Veto Act, had impermissibly granted the president a line-item veto, in
contravention of the all-or-nothing veto power of Article I, Section 7—as the
majority concluded34—or had merely delegated to the president the power to
treat various expenditures as setting maximum spending levels rather than
specifying exact sums—as the dissent contended.35 The majority thought that
the Line Item Veto Act impermissibly empowered the president to “repeal”
duly enacted laws, in violation of Article I, Section 7.36 Because the dissenters
took a less formalistic view of the Act, they did not think it granted repeal
authority, but only because the president acted pursuant to what they regarded
as a valid delegation of spending discretion. Even the Clinton dissenters did
not suggest that the president has any inherent authority to really repeal acts of
Congress. More importantly for present purposes, the entire framing of the
question in Clinton makes clear that a president’s assertion of authority to
30. 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
31. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
32. Train, 420 U.S. at 41.
33. See id. at 40.
34. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438–47.
35. See id. at 463–69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 473–80
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 438 (opinion of the Court) (“In both legal and practical effect, the President has
amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.”).
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decline to spend money appropriated by Congress raises a constitutional
question under Article I, Section 7, not just a statutory question. Every justice
who decided Clinton took for granted that the Constitution would forbid a
president from canceling funding Congress had required him to spend in the
absence of a valid delegation of funding-canceling authority.37
And that makes good sense. In giving the power of the purse to Congress,
rather than the president, the Framers no doubt meant to guard against the sorts
of abuses perpetrated by the Stuart kings, who repeatedly battled parliament
over appropriations.38 But that is not the only sort of abuse against which the
assignment of the purse power to Congress guards. Libertarians may worry
only about presidents attempting to spend money that Congress has not
authorized. But our Constitution assumes (quite correctly, in our view) that
threats to the public welfare and safety may sometimes arise from a decision to
spend too little on a pressing public need (by, for example, refusing to spend
money to save life and limb during a natural disaster, or to invest adequately in
the education of the nation’s children). A president who impounds funds in the
teeth of a congressional judgment that some government program must be
funded thereby usurps legislative power.
It might nonetheless be objected that our argument proves too much. If a
president’s refusal to spend money appropriated by Congress is
unconstitutional, does that mean that every less-than-total enforcement of
federal law by the executive also violates the Constitution? What about the
Obama Administration’s forbearance (thus far) from enforcing the federal
Controlled Substances Act39 with respect to possession of small quantities of
marijuana for medical purposes in states where such possession is legal?40 Or
the Administration’s decision to offer the chance to stay in the United States to
some non-citizens who came to this country as children?41 Do these policies
violate Article I, Section 7 and/or the Take Care Clause because they
implement the relevant federal statutes only partially?
We offer nothing like a full view on these questions here. We will say that
we find deeply troubling any suggestion that the president can simply choose
37. In dissent, Justice Scalia cited historical instances of presidents asserting a constitutional
right to cancel funding even absent a congressional grant of such discretion, but then cited Train
for the proposition that they were wrong. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 58 (James Madison) (observing that under Constitution,
members of Congress “hold the purse[,] that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the
history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually
enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have
wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government.”)
39. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006).
40. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen. to U.S. Attorneys, on
Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19,
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
41. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec. to David V. Aguilar,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., on Exercing Prosecutorial Discretion with
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the U.S. as Children (June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-cameto-us-as-children.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).

248

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR

[Vol. 112:237

not to enforce some law on the ground that he disagrees with the policy
underlying that law. At a minimum, we would expect the president to offer
some justification for not enforcing a law.42 With respect to marijuana
possession and deferred action on unlawful immigration, the Obama
Administration has invoked the traditional prosecutorial discretion that the
executive branch enjoys in such matters.43 Perhaps that argument is
persuasive; perhaps it is not. In any event, it is quite a different argument from
the one we are now considering with respect to federal spending. Thus, one
could conclude—as we do—that the president lacks the constitutional authority
to make unilateral spending cuts in the event that Congress fails to raise the
debt ceiling, without committing oneself to any particular view about the
constitutionality or wisdom of the Obama Administration’s policies with
respect to medical marijuana and immigration.
We have considered and found wanting each of the most plausible
explanations for the Obama Administration’s apparent conclusion that, in the
event that Congress fails to raise the debt ceiling, it will have to make
unilateral spending cuts. There is, however, one explanation that we would
applaud: Perhaps the Administration believes that under such circumstances,
unilateral spending cuts would be unconstitutional, but less unconstitutional
than exceeding the debt ceiling. For the reasons we set forth in How to Choose,
we would disagree with the conclusion; in our judgment, exceeding the debt
ceiling is the least unconstitutional option.44 Nonetheless, at least the contrary
conclusion that cutting spending would be less unconstitutional is the right
kind of judgment.
Unfortunately, none of the Obama Administration’s public statements to
date indicate that the President or his advisors regard the choice that the
president would face in the event that Congress fails to raise the debt ceiling as
a choice among unconstitutional options. Until they understand the nature of
the problem, we cannot expect them to offer a well-reasoned response to it.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this essay, we have treated the Obama Administration’s statements
regarding the debt ceiling as expressing sincere views about the law, but it may
be possible to read them instead as tactical moves in the budget negotiations
with congressional Republicans. As we have explained, the President’s
contingency plan of unilateral spending cuts would in fact usurp more power
from Congress than would unilaterally issuing debt. Perhaps the President has
ruled out the least unconstitutional option for the very reason that doing so is
42. Cf. Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage
Act (Feb. 23, 2011) (explaining Administration’s reasons for its decision no longer to defend
constitutionality of Section 3 of Defense of Marriage Act), available at
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
43. Id.; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen. to U.S. Attorneys, on
Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for
Medical Use (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance-2011for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
44. Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1215–17.
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most likely to frighten Republicans into making concessions at the bargaining
table. After all, a unilateral presidential decision to cut spending on various
projects, at his sole discretion, should be utterly unacceptable to his political
opponents. Congressional Republicans should, in that light, wish to limit the
President’s power in exactly the way that we have described here. They could
so limit him by actually passing an increase in the debt ceiling, however.
In a sense, learning that the Administration has been prevaricating would
be welcome news, for it would show that the President properly understands
that congressional failure to raise the debt ceiling would place him in the
trilemma we have described. Nonetheless, we regard this possibility as remote
for two reasons.
First, the politics suggest otherwise. Although Congress as an institution
would lose the most were the president to make unilateral spending cuts, in the
current political climate, Republicans have made it clear that they favor
spending cuts over additional borrowing on ideological grounds, either because
they have not considered the power that this would bestow upon the President,
or because they believe that he would not use that power in ways that they
would find unacceptable. Thus, taking congressionally unauthorized borrowing
off of the table makes little sense as a tactic designed to pressure congressional
Republicans.
Second, we hesitate to ascribe Machiavellian motives to the Administration. By all
indications, President Obama and his advisors sincerely believe that if Congress
fails to raise the debt ceiling, they will have no choice but to cut spending. We
think that they are wrong. In any case, they have to date not articulated persuasive
reasons for their belief.
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